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THE END OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN KOSOVO: 
DOES THE MEANING OF THE POPULATION FACTOR CHANGE?*
Vladimir Nikitović1
Abstract: Political issues in Kosovo were strongly related to its population
dynamics during the twentieth century, above all due to the “demographic
explosion” induced by the huge lag in fertility transition if compared to the
rest of Europe. However, soon after the turn of the century, the total fertility
rate in Kosovo has dropped to about the replacement level (2.1 children per
woman), which, along with permanent migration outflows since the 1990s,
indicates a new demographic era in sight. Using the recent evidence on
demographic and migration trends supported by the updated theoretical
considerations in the framework of demographic transition and the
migration cycle concept, we examine the key demographic implications that
could be expected in light of assumed population dynamics in Kosovo over
the next decades. The effects of the demographic momentum (population
increase purely on account of the young age structure) reduced by the
negative impact of emigration could expire up to 2035-40. As a result, the
decreasing and ageing population could become a highly probable future
of Kosovo in just 20-25 years, indicating the tremendous reversal could
happen in the perception of the population factor in this territory from the
viewpoint of political and security issues in the region.
Keywords: fertility transition, migration cycle concept, population projection,
Kosovo, demographic change
Introduction
Countries throughout the world nowadays face the total fertility rate (TFR)
that is below the theoretical level needed for replacement of generations.
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Furthermore, the subreplacement fertility is not only a phenomenon of
developed countries or exclusively of western civilization, as, according to the
United Nations estimates, 83 countries or around 46 percent of the world
population are experiencing the TFR lower than 2.1 children per woman,
including the entire European continent, but also some of the most populous
countries - China, the USA, Brazil, Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Germany, Iran,
Thailand and Great Britain. Until recently, some of these countries were
synonymous of very high fertility. The subreplacement fertility is the most
obvious consequence of major changes in demographic tendencies that
started to develop after the post-World War II baby boom first in Northern
and Western Europe (in the 1960s and 1970s), then in Southern Europe (in
the 1980s), and finally in Central and Eastern Europe (after 1990). These
changes are most often regarded as the Second Demographic Transition
(SDT), which should be conceived as a framework for understanding the
profound cultural change that will sooner or later induce demographic
changes, certainly not only in the fertility regime.2
However, while changes associated with the SDT were spreading from
Northwest to Southeast Europe, the substantial lags in a sub-regional
diffusion of the first demographic transition – reducing of very high fertility
levels typical for a backward and dominantly agrarian phase in the
development of societies – were taking part in Serbia. Since the 1960s, Serbia
represented a European phenomenon in terms of regional divergence of
demographic trends primarily caused by the differential TFR. In Kosovo, the
TFR was at least twice as high as in the rest of the country, and by far the
highest in Europe at the end of the 1980s. Therefore, the population doubling
time in Kosovo (17.5 years) in 1991 was two times faster than the world’s
peak (35 years) in the 1960s, while the rest of the country began to face
depopulation.3
Albeit unreliable fertility statistics since the dissolution of former
Yugoslavia, available data suggest that Kosovo has experienced a marked
decline in the TFR in this century, reaching the replacement level around
2 Ron Lesthaeghe, “The second demographic transition: A concise overview of its
development”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 111, No. 51,
December 2014, pp. 18112-18115.
3 Mirjana Rašević, “Fertility trends in Serbia during the 1990s”, Stanovništvo, Vol. 42, No. 1-
4, 2004, pp. 7-27; Vladimir Nikitović, Branislav Bajat and Dragan Blagojević, “Spatial patterns
of recent demographic trends in Serbia (1961-2010)”, Geografie, Vol. 121, no. 4, December
2016, p. 526.
2010.4 Compared to most of the European population, the knowledge on the
population development of Kosovo suffers from a lot of empty fields, which
are paradoxically bigger in recent decades than before the 1980s. There are
various reasons for such a situation – political (boycotts of population
censuses and official institutions for collecting data on vital statistics during
the period of Yugoslavia), socio-cultural, institutional (slow capacity building
of new institutions), economic, etc. However, despite unclear picture on
current population development in Kosovo, particularly at lower spatial levels,
there is no doubt that the two components of demographic change strongly
determined recent trends of population change in this territory – fertility and
international migration. Due to the long history of extremely high fertility
rates, typical for pre-transitional societies, it is reasonable to expect that
demographic momentum will provide population rise for at least several
decades ahead, contrary to most countries in the region, but the opposite
impact of migration component has proven to be significantly important for
the population trends since the 1990s, thus resembling the trends observed
in Albania after the fall of the Iron curtain. On the other hand, most of the
population in the region of Southeast Europe is expected to decline in the
next decades, which is recognized as the widening depopulation zone at the
east rim of the EU.5 Furthermore, the most recent sudden influx of asylum
seekers from West Asia and North Africa, whose final asylum destination
represents primarily the EU founding member countries, has its transition
route through the region, which quite directly opened an issue of future
migration in the region in terms of both the subreplacement fertility of
autochthonous population and the demographic surpluses in politically
unstable origin societies of immigrants.
Therefore, one could pose a quite meaningful question: How the
population trend in Kosovo will evolve in the following decades – will it
converge to the general trend of the region at a faster pace due to both
expected continuation of emigration (caused by slow economic development
and demographic surpluses of young and low educated persons) and
accelerated tempo of socio-cultural changes associated with the SDT
(similarly to the trends in diffusion of the first demographic transition in
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4 Ibid., p. 526.
5 Vladimir Nikitović, “Long-term effects of low fertility in the region of former Yugoslavia”,
Stanovništvo, Vol. 54, No. 2, July-December 2016, pp. 27-58; United Nations, World
Population Prospects 2017 – Data Booklet, United Nations – Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Division, New York, 2017.
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regions that were the last to experience it), or will it lag in demographic
change as it was the case during the period of Yugoslavia? The reasoning
behind this aim is closely connected to quite different political and societal
conditions in which Kosovo’s population had been experiencing its fast
growing during the period of Yugoslavia in comparison to what could be
expected in possible EU future of the region. This could be concluded when
analysing previous findings of studies on fertility behaviour of women in
Kosovo, which indicate that specific anthropological, cultural and political
factors might be those that decisively influenced the population dynamics in
this sub-region during the socialism period, since the levels of economic
development and education in comparison with other sub-regions of Serbia
at the time, despite their limitations, could hardly be those that made women
have the ideal and desirable number of children smaller than the actual.6
Therefore, it is easier to understand that during the period of former
Yugoslavia, the TFR of the ethnic Albanian population in Serbia was much
higher in Kosovo than in other regions of the country, but also in relation to
Albania (on average one child).7 Recent studies substantially grounded on the
diffusion theory as an explanation for spatial patterns of demographic change
suggest that sociocultural heterogeneity prevent the equal diffusion of
attitudes and information that support modern reproductive ideas and
behaviour, thus confirming that in Kosovo, unlike the rest of the country, “the
effect of the socio-economic development on changes in fertility had been
conditional on the perceptions and customs of individual ethnic groups and
their susceptibility to change”.8 In other words, cultural and ideational
changes as assumed by the SDT could be more relevant for women’s birth
decisions in Kosovo in this century than it was the case until very recently.
6 Mirjana Rašević and Mina Petrović, “Is there a basis for implementing a family planning
programme in Kosovo and Metohija?, Balkan Demographic Papers, Vol. 4, 2001, Laboratory
of demographic and social analyses, Department of Planning and Regional Development,
University of Thessaly, http://www.demobalk.org/Publications/papers/docs/Demobalk
_Papers_Doc_00013.pdf; Mimosa Dushi, “Number of children among generations: The case
of Kosova”, Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 37-40.
7 Mirjana Rašević, “Fertility trends in Serbia during the 1990s”, op. cit., p. 12; Jane Falkingham
and Arjan Gjonca, “Fertility transition in Communist Albania, 1950–90”, Population Studies,
Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 309–318; KAS, “Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2014”,
November 2014, Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Pristina, http://ask.rks-gov.net/ENG/
publikimet/doc_download/1192-statistical-yearbookof-the-republic-of-kosovo-2014.
8 Murat M. Yücesahin and Murat E. Özgür, “Regional Fertility Differences in Turkey: Persistent
High Fertility in the Southeast”, Population Space and Place, Vol. 14, No. 2, March/April
2008, pp. 137; Mirjana Rašević, “Fertility trends in Serbia during the 1990s”, op. cit., p. 21.
Therefore, we aim to examine the long-term effects of the changes in the
two arguably crucial components of the demographic future of Kosovo in this
century – fertility and international migration. In that sense, we try to achieve
two goals at the same time: to assess realistic population projection outcomes
and to warn decision-makers on future implications of demographic and
migration trends in Kosovo in the context of the region of former Yugoslavia.
Recent improvements in the methodology of population estimates and
projections by the UN Population Division, particularly for populations with
incomplete and rather shorter data series, helped us in producing
methodologically and regionally consistent set of population projections for
Kosovo, as a basis for answering the opening questions of the paper. 
Hypothesis on components of population change 
– the theoretical and methodological framework 
We framed our hypothesis about components of future population
dynamics in Kosovo inside the projection model that is used by the Population
Division of the UN (hereafter the UN model) for its latest releases of the World
Population Prospects (2012-17). Also, the hypothesis on future fertility and
mortality of the population in Kosovo are completely derived from the UN
model, which we consider to be a very reasonable decision since the model
is based on the recent theoretical achievements in terms of modelling the
demographic transition, whereby it draws its strength from the data on
fertility and mortality for all countries of the world. The model also has the
technical benefits – it is well documented, fully transparent, probabilistically
consistent, and implemented in the open-source R software, thus, allowing
for easy adjustments and modifications of input parameters where needed.9
This was particularly beneficial for the purpose of the paper since the UN
does not produce projections for territories whose borders are under dispute
as is the case with Kosovo.10 Besides, as the UN migration hypotheses are not
Kosovo: sui generis or precedent in international relations 303
9 Adrian E. Raftery, Leontine Alkema and Patrick Gerland, “Bayesian Population Projections
for the United Nations”, Statistical Science, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 2014, pp. 58-68; United
Nations, “World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Methodology of the United
Nations Population Estimates and Projections”, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.250, 2017,
United Nations – Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New
York, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_Methodology.pdf
10 UN dataset recognizes only Serbia including disputed territory of Kosovo (it unilaterally
proclaimed independence from Serbia in 2008) in accordance with the UNSCR No.
1244/1999.
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theoretically grounded (apart from a lack of data for Kosovo), as is usually
the case with migration projections, we instead included our hypothesis
(based on the “migration cycle concept”) in the UN projection model.11
Fertility hypothesis: the century of the transition 
to subreplacement fertility in Kosovo?
According to the onset of the first demographic transition, the two sub-
regions in former Yugoslavia can be differentiated: “Early starters” (Slovenia,
Croatia, Vojvodina, and Central Serbia) and “Late starters” (Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia). The latter sub-region,
except Kosovo, experienced the decline to the subreplacement fertility two-
three decades later than the former.12 Currently, the whole region of former
Yugoslavia is characterized by the subreplacement TFR (below 2.1), with the
longest duration in Vojvodina, Central Serbia and Croatia, and the shortest in
Kosovo.13 Although the fertility transition in Kosovo may have begun in the
1920s and 1930s, according to some indications, it was surely discontinued
and brought back to the pre-transitional period by the late 1960s, as the TFR
was above five even in the 1970s.14 A slow decline in the TFR in the next two
decades resulted in its still high level, even before the breakup of Yugoslavia
(3.9 in 1990); the TFR was high even after the 1990s Yugoslav wars (3.0 in
2000), and only recently fell just below 2.1.15
From a long-term perspective, changes in fertility behaviour are decisive
for the size and age structure of a given population in the absence of sudden
catastrophic events. The UN model, in accordance with the recent evidence
of recovery of the post-transitional fertility, predicts convergence of the total
11 Details on the specific adjustments of input parameters (initial population, fertility,
mortality, and migration rates) and the projection procedure for the region of former
Yugoslavia, which were used for the forecast simulations presented and interpreted in this
paper, are fully described in: Vladimir Nikitović, “Long-term effects of low fertility in the
region of former Yugoslavia”, op. cit.
12 Ibid., p. 35.
13 Damir Josipovič, “The Post-Yugoslav Space on a Demographic Crossway: 25 Years after the
Collapse of Yugoslavia”, Stanovništvo, Vol. 54, No. 1, January-July 2016, pp. 15-40; Vladimir
Nikitović, Branislav Bajat and Dragan Blagojević, “Spatial patterns of recent demographic
trends in Serbia (1961-2010)”, op. cit.
14 Mirjana Rašević, “Fertility trends in Serbia during the 1990s”, op. cit., p. 7.
15 Damir Josipovič, “The Post-Yugoslav Space on a Demographic Crossway: 25 Years after the
Collapse of Yugoslavia”, op. cit., p. 16.
fertility rates in the region towards the level of 1.8 by the end of the century.16
The total fertility rate across the region will most probably experience a mild
increase by 2055, ranging between 1.55 (Bosnia & Herzegovina and
Vojvodina) and 1.84 (Slovenia). Due to the lag in the onset of the transition
to low fertility, the model predicts that the transition in Kosovo would last
until 2070 (the lowest TFR of 1.71), with a target value of 1.75 in 2100.17
For the sake of an insight in “theoretical” limits of future demographic
change, we also calculated the UN traditional high and low variants, which differ
from the medium variant (forecast) in the total fertility rate by +/-0.5 children
per woman, respectively. The UN model suggests that there are even 10%
chance that the TFR in Kosovo could fall by 0.5 (low variant) until 2100, thus,
reaching the “lowest-low” fertility, the same as the post-communist CEE
countries had experienced at the beginning of the century. The official
projections of the population of Kosovo also assume a further decline in fertility
in the coming decades, but are more pessimistic than the UN model. Namely,
the TFR is expected to fall to 1.7 by 2031, and then to the current level of Serbia
excluding Kosovo (1.45) by 2061 according to the “medium” variant, usually
regarded as to the most probable, while the range between high and low variant
of the TFR is predicted to be 1.9-1.1 in 2061, which is narrower than the 80%
prediction interval of 1.22-2.05 resulted from the UN model for the same year.18
International migration assumption: the century of emigration from Kosovo?  
The whole region of former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia) is recognized
as an emigrational at the beginning of this century, whereas Kosovo
represents a specifically pronounced emigration area since the 1990s.19 A
recently developed “model of the migration cycle”, based on evidence from
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16 Joshua. R. Goldstein, Tomas Sobotka and Aiva Jasilioniene, “The end of lowest-low fertility?”,
Population and Development Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 2009, pp. 663-699.
17 Vladimir Nikitović, “Long-term effects of low fertility in the region of former Yugoslavia”,
op. cit., p. 39.
18 KAS, “Kosovo Population Projection 2011–2061”, December 2013, Kosovo Agency of
Statistics, Pristina, http://ask.rks-gov.net/ENG/publikimet/doc_download/1126-kosovo-
population-projection-2011-2061, p. 27-28.
19 Heinz Fassmann, Elisabete Musil, Roman Bauer, Atila Melegh and Kathrin Gruber, “Longer-
Term Demographic Dynamics in South-East Europe: Convergent, Divergent and Delayed
Development Paths”, Central and Eastern European Migration Review, Vol. 3, no. 2,
December 2014, pp. 150–172; Besim Gollopeni, “Kosovar emigration: Causes, Losses and
Benefits”. Sociologija i prostor, Vol. 54, No. 3, Prosinac 2016, pp. 295-314.
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the ‘old’ immigration countries in Europe, which experienced a gradual long-
term transition from predominantly emigration to typical immigration
countries in conditions of the subreplacement fertility, provided the
theoretical framework for formulating migration assumption in the paper, as
it seems that the successor states of former Yugoslavia could experience
common migration trends in the future due to both officially proclaimed
strategic goals of their governments with respect to the EU accession and
expected position of the region itself as to the global migration directions.20
According to this heuristic concept, the region of former Yugoslavia,
excluding Slovenia, could be considered as stuck in the initial, pre-transition
stage. We assumed 2035 as a symbolic milestone between net emigration and
net immigration according to the current prospects of further EU enlargement
to the Western Balkans, which implies that the whole region of the former
Yugoslavia would certainly be a part of the EU by the time. We considered the
membership in the EU as an indicator that the population of a member state
has reached the level of living standard and quality of life that can affect the
reduction of outflows and the increase of inflows to the country in the long
run. Prior to 2035, we account for the intensified post-accession emigration
from the whole region due to increased labour mobility associated with slow
economic growth in new EU members by analogy to the evidence from the
Eastern enlargement and based on the expectations from the future in the EU.21
If we focus on the first 40-year period (2015-2055) of the projection horizon
considered in this paper, the sub-region of “Early starters” excluding Slovenia
is supposed to exit the initial or pre-transition stage by 2035, and to experience
the intermediate or transition stage (immigration typically outweighs
emigration) thereafter, while the “Late starters” sub-region would follow the
20 Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger, “‘Old’ immigration countries in Europe. The concept
and empirical examples”, in: Marek Okólski (ed.), European Immigrations: Trends,
structures and policy implications, IMISCOE Research Series, Amsterdam University Press,
Amsterdam, 2012, p. 67-68.
21 Marek Kupiszewski, “Migration in Poland in the Period of Transition - the Adjustment to the
Labour Market Change”, in: Masaaki Kuboniwa and Yoshiaki Nishimura (eds.) Economics of
Intergenerational Equity in Transnational Economies, Maruzen Co. Ltd, Tokyo, 2006; Marek
Kupiszewski, Dorota Kupiszewska and Vladimir Nikitović, Impact of demographic and
migration flows on Serbia, International Organization for Migration - Mission to Serbia,
Belgrade, 2012; Vladimir Nikitović, “Migraciona tranzicija u Srbiji: Demografska perspektiva”,
Sociologija, God. 55, br. 2, 2013, str. 187-208; Mirjana Rašević, Vladimir Nikitović, Dragana
Lukić-Bošnjak, “How to motivate policy makers to face demographic challenges?” Zbornik
Matice Srpske za društvene nauke, Vol. 148, No. 3, 2014, pp. 607-617.
same course with a delay of 5-10 years.22 However, Kosovo seems to be the
only exception in the region of former Yugoslavia since we could not find
convincing evidence that this population is likely to undergo fundamental
societal changes needed to enter the intermediate transition stage during the
projection period (Figure 1). This is acknowledged by the official population
projection for Kosovo, which does not assume cessation of net emigration until
2061 given pronounced emigration potential and generally unfavourable
economic conditions in that territory. Yet, after 2035, the projection assumes
a certain reduction in net emigration by the “medium” (most probable) variant,
or even a turn into a mild net immigration according to the high variant.23
Figure 1: Assumed average annual net migration rate 
(per thousand of the 2015 population), 2015-2055 (five-year periods)
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Source: Author’s calculation based on the “migration cycle model” considerations and the
literature review
22 We found reasonable to consider and interpret possible changes in migration trends no
longer than the mid-century given general volatility of this component and consequently
a high long-term uncertainty; therefore, no specific migration assumption was made after
2055, but only further linear decrease in net migration rate towards zero by 2100.
23 KAS, “Kosovo Population Projection 2011–2061”, op. cit., p. 31-33.
Demographic future of Kosovo
The most important indicators of future demographic change in Kosovo,
which resulted from the long-term population projection simulations as
described in the introduction of the previous section, are presented and
interpreted in the context of contextually and comparatively relevant region
of former Yugoslavia. This might help readers to more easily perceive
magnitude and tempo of the projected demographic changes in Kosovo. For
the sake of an insight in “theoretical” limits of future demographic change,
we also calculated the UN traditional high and low variants, which differ from
the median (most probable) total fertility rate by +/-0.5 children per woman,
respectively.
Changes in population size and age structure until 2100
According to the most likely future of the forecast simulation (median of
the distribution), only Kosovo will not experience a decline in the total
population in the region of former Yugoslavia by the mid-century (Table 1).24
Although this result might not be a surprise, the population dynamics over
the projection period and changes in crucial demographic indicators reveal
that the meaning of the population factor in Kosovo will certainly experience
substantial changes in relation to the period of former Yugoslavia, particularly
in the context of political implications. 
Table 1: Total population forecast (median and 80% prediction interval),
2015-2100, including the UN traditional high-low bounds of the forecast
(median TFR +/- 0.5)
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24 Vladimir Nikitović, “Long-term effects of low fertility in the region of former Yugoslavia”,
op. cit., p. 48.
Country/
Territory Year 80% prediction interval
The UN traditional low-
high variants
Lower limit Median Upper limit Low fert. High fert.
Former
Yugoslavia
2015 21,200,300
2035 19,155,960 19,436,430 19,708,720 18,473,454 20,458,210
2055 16,900,560 17,586,480 18,179,220 15,429,237 20,068,480
2100 12,318,762 14,037,020 15,551,010 8,535,989 22,054,810
Source: Author’s calculation based on the population forecast simulations
Note: The results for Serbia (80% prediction interval including median) are not simply the
summation of its constituent parts but present aggregations across the probabilistic
distributions of simulated outcomes.
While the total population in the region would most probably decrease by
16.9 percent, the population in Kosovo is expected to rise by 9.3 percent
between 2015 and 2055. This rise could have been much higher due to the
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Country/
Territory Year 80% prediction interval
The UN traditional low-
high variants
Lower limit Median Upper limit Low fert. High fert.
Vojvodina
2015 1,855,571
2035 1,461,097 1,500,021 1,539,506 1,425,636 1,572,327
2055 1,187,610 1,268,060 1,350,326 1,104,714 1,447,986
2100 763,686 947,372 1,144,705 570,818 1,505,964
Central
Serbia
2015 5,140,644
2035 4,153,445 4,279,935 4,389,473 4,070,693 4,487,032
2055 3,478,100 3,741,154 3,976,102 3,272,474 4,260,945
2100 2,413,114 3,053,492 3,580,905 1,846,681 4,735,175
Kosovo
2015 1,855,853
2035 1,980,099 2,067,377 2,155,741 1,942,859 2,195,571
2055 1,829,773 2,028,908 2,244,909 1,753,505 2,353,193
2100 947,567 1,428,016 1,971,471 773,441 2,442,654
Serbia
excluding
Kosovo
2015 6,996,215
2035 5,640,035 5,774,646 5,900,948 5,496,328 6,059,359
2055 4,728,966 5,000,839 5,247,676 4,377,188 5,708,931
2100 3,322,863 4,003,528 4,573,074 2,417,500 6,241,139
Serbia
including
Kosovo
2015 8,852,068
2035 7,682,827 7,838,320 7,996,070 7,439,188 8,254,929
2055 6,689,436 7,032,649 7,371,740 6,130,693 8,062,124
2100 4,566,661 5,435,412 6,235,772 3,190,941 8,683,793
projected positive natural change of even 564 thousand people, resulting from
positive demographic momentum. Yet, its counterbalance is represented by
the overall impact of negative net migration, which summed over the period
should account for the population loss of 391 thousand persons (of which 267
thousand due to the direct effect). Furthermore, the population increase in
Kosovo by 2055 practically results from the increase during the first 20-year
period of the projection (Table 1). Indeed, the majority of the positive effect
of demographic momentum (362 thousand more live births than deaths) is
expected to be realized up to 2035, which is also the period of stronger
emigration due to the higher volatility of socio-economic conditions.
It should be noted that the maximum population size of Kosovo will most
probably be reached by 2040 (2.08 million), followed by a period when the
demographic momentum will be insufficient to cancel the impact of the
negative migration balance (Figure 2). If we want to estimate the power of
the demographic momentum to drive the population increase despite the
subreplacement fertility, a hypothetical “closed” population (zero-migration
balance) scenario has to be considered. In that scenario, the maximum
population size of Kosovo would be most probably reached by 2065 (2,43
million), which means that the fertility rates by previous generations provided
population growth for about 60 years ahead in relation to the first decade of
this century when the fertility transition to below replacement level has
begun. However, apart from the pure theoretical character of a “closed”
population concept, no realistic empirical evidence could be found to support
a scenario which would neglect the significant impact of net emigration on
demographic change in Kosovo at least in the next two decades when the
demographic momentum should reach its peak. This is illustrated by the
distribution of future outcomes as to the UN model (assumes a low
probability of return to replacement fertility level during the whole century)
presented in Figure 2, according to which the maximum size of the “closed”
population would be beyond the upper limit of the 95% prediction interval.
Furthermore, Figure 2 suggests that the range between traditional high and
low variant in regular world population prospects by the UN Population
Division, representing bounds of +/- 0.5 in relation to the TFR of the medium
variant, are much wider than the 80% prediction interval of the forecast. It
indicates that the role of migration balance could be of greater importance
if compared to the previous periods.  
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Figure 2: Observed and forecasted population size of Kosovo, 1950-2100
Source: Author’s calculation based on the population forecast simulations.
Note: Solid line represents the past trend and the most probable future,
while the dashed and dotted lines show the bounds of the prediction intervals
which should contain the future value with probabilities of 80% and 95%,
respectively. The lines with markers show the bounds in accordance with the
traditional high and low variant in the UN projections (median TFR +/- 0.5
children per woman).
Although the power of demographic momentum is undoubtedly strong
and important for the future demographic change of Kosovo, its capacity is
certainly limited in the long run in terms of the expected fertility transition
associated with the SDT. Namely, according to the model simulations, the
chances that the total population in Kosovo and Slovenia (the only part of
former Yugoslavia that has entered the migration transition) by 2100 would
be the same as the current is about 5 and 35 percent, respectively – this
clearly indicates that the subreplacement fertility will strongly reduce
population size of Kosovo if a transition to positive net migration is missing
in the long run.25
25 Vladimir Nikitović, “Long-term effects of low fertility in the region of former Yugoslavia”,
op. cit., p. 42.
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It is evident that the large lag in the fertility transition onset in Kosovo
induced lags in relevant demographic processes in that territory if compared
to populations in its neighbourhood. Consequently, the demographically very
young population in Kosovo is currently contrasted with the surrounding old
populations. However, significant structural changes in terms of rapid
population ageing in Kosovo should be expected in this century. Although the
share of persons aged 65 years and above in the total population will most
probably increase by 75% (from 16.37% to 28.64%) between 2015 and 2055
in the region of former Yugoslavia, this indicator will more than triple in
Kosovo in the same period (from 7.30% to 23.82%), with the abrupt increase
experienced already by 2035 (13.94%).26 The same stands for the old age
dependency ratio (number of persons older than 65 in relation to those aged
20-64 years) as one of the crucial indicators in the context of the modern
conception of sustainable demographic development.27 Concurrently, both
the current share of young persons (below 15 years of age) and the share of
those in education age (5-24 years) is expected to be almost halved by 2055
in Kosovo (from 26.44% to 14.27% and from 37.47% to 20.42%, respectively).
These immense disturbances in the age composition of the population
can be more easily comprehended if we compare the population pyramids
of Serbia excl. Kosovo and Kosovo in the three cross sections of time (Figure
3). In just a 40 year from now, the demographic pressure of the older
population in Kosovo could be much more pronounced than it is currently
the case in Serbia excluding Kosovo, where the demographic situation is most
commonly regarded as the very unfavourable. This upside-down change of
the population pyramid in Kosovo between 2015 and 2055 in comparison
with the gradual ageing of the pyramid of Serbia excl. Kosovo, suggests that
Kosovo will have to face demographic challenges that are quite different from
those it has faced so far. In that sense, one can comprehend current and
expected huge emigration from Kosovo as intrinsically similar to the
emigration trends between the mid-1960s and the 1980s observed in former
Yugoslavia, which were fuelled by surpluses of low qualified labour force born
during the post-war baby-boom.
26 Ibid., p. 43.
27 Wolfgang Lutz, “A Population Policy Rationale for the Twenty-First Century”, Population
and Development Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, September 2014, p. 528.
Source: Author’s calculation based on the population forecast simulations
Note: Solid lines represent observed pyramid in 2015 and its most probable future in 2055
and 2100 (median of the distribution) 
Impact of migration on demographic change by the mid-century
Given the expected transition to the subreplacement fertility and highly
negative trends in terms of international migration in Kosovo, we have
specifically assessed the migration impact from the aspect of the assumed
stages of the migration transition on population dynamics in this sub-region
by the mid-century. For that purpose, apart from the Forecast simulation, as
discussed in the previous paragraphs, we prepared the Zero migration
simulation based on the assumptions that all the age-specific fertility and
mortality rates are as per the Forecast, while the net migration is set to zero.
The comparison between the medians of the two simulations in terms of the
total population size of Kosovo and comparatively relevant sub-regions of
former Yugoslavia is presented in Table 2.
This impact of migration may be decomposed into a direct and an indirect
component. The former consists of the total net migration flows summed
over the forecast period, while the latter refers to the births and deaths which
the migration either prevented or caused to happen, depending on the
overall direction of migration flows, also summed over the forecast period.
It should be noted that, in terms of indirect migration impact, no reference
is made to the hypothetical demographic events which might have happened
to the emigrants had they not emigrated. Table 2 shows the migration-related
components of the forecasted population dynamics. As to the assumptions
of the model, we review its results in relation to 2035 when it is assumed
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Figure 3: Population pyramid of Serbia excl. Kosovo and Kosovo, 
2015, 2055, 2100
that large post-accession emigration waves, induced by the EU enlargement
towards the Western Balkans, will disappear throughout the region while the
net migration rate in Kosovo will return to its current level (Figure 1).
Table 2: Impact of migration on population change – difference between
Forecast and Zero migration simulation (median), 2015-2035-2055
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Country/
Territory
Migration impact (thousand), 
2015-2035 
Migration impact (thousand), 
2035-2055
Total Direct
Indirect
Total Direct
Indirect
Total Births Deaths Total Births Deaths
Former
Yugoslavia -515.0 -384.1 -130.9 -114.0 16.9 115.9 258.8 -142.9 -98.2 44.7
Vojvodina -99.5 -75.4 -24.1 -21.7 2.3 36.6 50.4 -13.8 -14.4 -0.6
Central Serbia -212.3 -160.3 -52.0 -48.5 3.5 70.6 107.1 -36.5 -33.9 2.5
Kosovo -184.2 -148.3 -35.9 -32.2 3.7 -206.5 -118.6 -87.8 -79.3 8.5
Serbia excl.
Kosovo -312.9 -235.8 -77.1 -70.0 7.1 107.7 157.5 -49.8 -48.0 1.8
Serbia incl.
Kosovo -496.2 -384.1 -112.1 -102.3 9.8 -101.2 38.8 -140.1 -126.3 13.7
Source: Author’s calculation based on the population forecast simulations
According to the Forecast, the population in Kosovo in 2035 will be smaller
by 184 thousand than it would be if there were no migration. The direct
impact of migration on the population in the forecast equals -148 thousand.
This is the net migration, aggregated over the period from 2015 to 2035. In
the case of negative net migration, the indirect impact of migration consists
of both the loss of births owing to the emigration of potential mothers and
the loss of the emigrants’ deaths. As Table 2 suggests, the effect of the latter
is small. The number of births which female emigrants would have delivered
had they not emigrated accounts for 32 and even 79 thousand in the first and
the second 20-year period, respectively. Likewise, the number of deaths was
reduced by less than 4 and 9 thousand by migration during the two periods,
respectively; these people might have died anyway, but their death occurred
after they emigrated, so it cannot be counted in the figures for Kosovo, as
they did not number among the population of the region at the time of death.
The overall indirect impact of migration is -36 thousand by 2035, and even
88 thousand between 2035 and 2055.
In relative terms, the expected population increase in Kosovo (21% of the
initial population) on account of strong demographic momentum would be
almost halved by 2035 due to the direct or indirect impact of migration. Thus,
net emigration represents a strong counterweight to the very high positive
natural change. Almost 20% of the migration induced (direct and indirect)
decline of the population in Kosovo by 2035 is due to migration-related,
potential, but not ‘consumed’, natural change (Table 2). 
The ruinous synergetic effect of long-term emigration could be best
perceived when the period after the assumed accession to the EU is analysed.
In case of Kosovo, the overall migration-induced population decrease
between 2035 and 2055 would be higher than in the first 20-year period of
the projection (207 vs. 184 thousand) despite smaller direct migration loss
(119 vs. 148 thousand) – the indirect migration impact (natural change) would
present even 43% percent of the overall migration-induced population
decline.
Finally, we quantified the impact of migration on selected demographic
indicators by calculating the percentage difference between the value of the
indicator for both cross-sections 2035 and 2055 in the Forecast and the Zero
migration simulation, scaled to the latter (Table 3). In the Forecast, the total
population of Kosovo is smaller by 8.2% and 16.2% in 2035 and 2055,
respectively as a result of migration. Migration also has a significant impact
on the age structure of the population. As assumed in the Forecast, it would
decrease the share of the population aged 0-14 in Kosovo by 6.5% and
increase both the share of the population older than 65 years and old-age
dependency ratio by even 13.4% and 13.6%, respectively until 2035. The
negative migration impact on the share of the older population in Kosovo
would further increase by 2055, while the transition to net immigration in
Serbia excluding Kosovo after 2035 would even induce positive migration
impact in terms of the share of the young population (Table 3), thus
highlighting importance of migration transition for the region in this century.  
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Source: Author’s calculation based on the population forecast simulations
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Table 3: Migration induced changes for selected demographic indicators:
percentage difference between Forecast and Zero migration simulation
(median), 2035 and 2055
Country/
Territory
Time cross
section
Total
population
Share of young/old age groups in total
Old-age
dependency
ratio 
(65+/20-64)
Below 15
years
School age
(5-24)
Above 65
years
Above 85
years
2035
Former
Yugoslavia -2.59 -2.82 -1.72 3.92 3.24 4.69
Vojvodina -6.22 -5.46 -2.70 8.02 8.11 10.21
Central Serbia -4.73 -4.07 -1.99 6.07 5.62 7.69
Kosovo -8.18 -6.49 -5.01 13.43 11.34 13.57
Serbia
excluding
Kosovo
-5.14 -4.43 -2.20 6.63 6.20 8.36
Serbia
including
Kosovo
-5.95 -5.33 -3.32 8.06 7.39 9.40
2055
Former
Yugoslavia -2.23 0.00 -0.36 2.73 4.15 4.12
Vojvodina -4.72 2.62 0.90 3.40 7.28 5.82
Central Serbia -3.65 1.92 0.41 2.62 5.63 4.51
Kosovo -16.15 -8.70 -7.22 20.49 24.43 25.85
Serbia
excluding
Kosovo
-3.94 2.01 0.56 2.81 6.00 4.81
Serbia
including
Kosovo
-7.83 -1.73 -2.22 7.77 11.29 10.96
Conclusions
During the period of former Yugoslavia, political crises in Kosovo were
usually interpreted in the context of demographic factors, which was not
surprising since the population in that territory had been growing at rates
typical for Africa at the time while much of the country had started to
experience the subreplacement fertility. Paradoxically, the knowledge on
population development in Kosovo was limited even then, but particularly
after the dissolution of Yugoslavia since there was a gap of 30 years (1981-
2011) without the population census data on Albanian majority, who was the
driving force of the “demographic explosion”. Coincidence or not, the 30-year
period was  politically the most turbulent in the recent history of Kosovo – it
started with protests on the constitutional status of the province in 1981 and
culminated with a unilateral declaration of its independence in 2008.
Available statistics on the actual demographic change in Kosovo usually offers
contradictory data particularly as to the fertility and migration, which,
therefore, makes it difficult to understand current population dynamics and
processes in that territory. Furthermore, a lack of comprehensive
interpretation of a tremendous delay in the onset of the first demographic
transition in Kosovo in relation to the surrounding populations, which should
explain the failure of cultural and economic drivers of the fertility transition,
suggests that a political factor might have had an important impact on
demographic change in that territory until recently.
However, at the beginning of this century, apart from the crisis on the
political status of Kosovo, two important factors inducing population
dynamics have changed – high increase in emigration since the 1990s and
beginning of the transition to the subreplacement fertility. Therefore, in this
paper, we aimed to see whether the meaning of demographic factors in
Kosovo would be changed in this century, particularly from the aspect of the
expected EU future, as it would imply a substantial change in the factors
driving demographic development. Thus, we based our analysis on recent
improvements in theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly regarding
the change in fertility and migration to consider the long-term implications
of population dynamics in Kosovo. The probabilistic model on future fertility
and mortality used for the current UN World Population Prospects and
“migration cycle concept” served us as the methodological tools. 
Although it seems certain that only Kosovo will not experience a decline in
the total population in the region of former Yugoslavia by the mid-century, the
meaning of demographic factors in Kosovo will undoubtedly experience
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substantial changes. Namely, demographic momentum fuelled by fertility rates
of previous generations could provide the population growth for about 60 years
ahead, but it will most probably be considerably weakened by the negative
migration balance. Therefore, the population increase in Kosovo by the mid-
century would practically result from the increase during the next 20 years, which
would also be the period of stronger emigration due to the higher volatility of
socio-economic conditions, particularly in case of intensified post-accession
emigration. Kosovo will most probably reach its maximum population size by
2040 (2.08 million), when a period of almost depleted demographic momentum
should follow. The power of demographic momentum is certainly limited in the
long run in terms of expected fertility reduction associated with the second
demographic transition, which implies a strong decline in population size of
Kosovo if a transition to positive net migration is missing by the end of the century.
From the viewpoint of modern sustainable demographic development,
reduction in the population size of Kosovo would be a minor issue in
comparison with changes in its age structure. Much faster population ageing
in Kosovo should be expected in relation to surrounding populations – while
the share of persons older than 65 years would increase by 75% in the region
of former Yugoslavia by 2055, it would more than triple in Kosovo. The
projection of age structure, also, suggests that the expected emigration from
Kosovo might be intrinsically similar to the emigration trends between the mid-
1960s and the 1980s in the former Yugoslavia, which were fuelled by surpluses
of low skilled labour force born during the post-war baby-boom. Thus, given
the maximum effects of demographic momentum in the next 20-30 years,
along with expected slow economic development, it is reasonable to expect a
continuation of current emigration trends. A specific findings refer to strong
indirect effects of emigration – although the projected population increase in
Kosovo on account of strong demographic momentum could be almost halved
by 2035 due to the overall impact of migration, the indirect migration loss on
account of prevented natural change could reach more than 40% of the overall
migration-related population decline between 2035 and 2055. 
The theoretical framework that we used in the paper to interpret possible
demographic future of Kosovo is closely related to the cultural and ideational
change behind the second demographic transition. Such a transition implies
adopting modern family norms, which in turn should help in the development
of modern political and economic systems. If we accept that the population of
Kosovo is on the course of substantial change of demographic regime, it seems
that the tempo of further diffusion of the ideational changes could be strongly
dependent on the process of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans.
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